Torts - Negligence - Comparative Negligence Statute by Whelan, Thomas P.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 4 June 1936 Article 5
Torts - Negligence - Comparative Negligence
Statute
Thomas P. Whelan
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Thomas P. Whelan, Torts - Negligence - Comparative Negligence Statute, 20 Marq. L. Rev. 189 (1936).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol20/iss4/5
M'Culloch v. Maryland and Collector v. Day are such potent forces
with the present Court.:9
There has been some suggestion that the constitution need not be
amended to permit legislatures, states and federal, to function more
effectively. But Professor Corwin in his "Twilight of the Supreme
Court" missed his guess. The cause, however, is not lost. The President
has alluded recently to the probability that in spite of precedents the
agencies of government, federal and state, may be permitted to func-
tion in expanding fields.2 0 The general declaratory and restrictive pro-
visions of the constitution do not necessarily preclude it. Hope for the
future lies in a bench made up of men who are not only impartial, not
only honest, but men who are also statesmen.
VERNON X. MILLER
TORTS-NEGLIGENcE-CoMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE STATUTE.-The
Wisconsin Legislature in 1931 enacted the following legislative act:
"Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or his legal representative, to recover damages for negligence
resulting in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence
was not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recov-
ery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished by the jury
in the proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the per-
son recovering."
1l
This Act is now commonly known as the Comparative Negligence
Law. However, previous to 1931 there were in Wisconsin two com-
parative negligence acts. It is true that they were strictly limited, but
the principle of comparative negligence was applicable in both. Section
192.50 (3) of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935) still reads as follows: "In
all actions hereafter brought against such railroad company, under or
by virtue of any of the provisions of this section to recover damages for
personal injuries to any employee, or where such injuries have resulted
in his death, the fact that the employee may have been guilty of con-
tributory negligence shall not bar recovery, but the damages shall be
diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence at-
tributable to such employee."Section 192.29 (6) of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935) reads as fol-
lows: "ACTION FOR DAMAGES, ORDINARY CARE. In any action brought
by any person or his legal representatives against a corporation operat-
ing a railroad in this State, to recover for personal injuries or death,
if it appear that the injury or death in question was caused by the
negligent omission of such corporation to comply with the requirements
of this section, the fact that the person injured or killed was guilty of a
19 It is not the particular choice of policy which the Court made in the Ashton
case that is meant to be criticise*d. It must be conceded that the earlier cases
are enlightening and ought to be considered. It is the approach to the prob-
lem that is criticized herein, the idea that decisions in earlier cases preclude
an examination of an existing controversy on its merits.
20 Roosevelt, "Every Member of the Legal Profession" (1936) 2 VITAL SPEECHES
579. This is the address the President delivered at the Arkansas Centennial
Celebration at Little Rock, June 10, 1936.
'Wis. Laws (1931) c. 242; Wis. STAT. (1935) § 331.045.
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slight want of ordinary care, contributing to the injury or death, shall
not bar a recovery. The burden of proof that the person injured or
killed was guilty of more than a slight want of ordinary care contrib-
uting to the injury or death shall be upon the defendant."
We are now concerned primarily with a discussion of Section
331.045 of the Wisconsin Statutes (1935) which is familiarly known
as the Comparative Negligence Law. We are concerned only in an in-
direct way with the two comparative negligence acts cited and set forth
above. How far have they been superceded or have they been limited
or abrogated by Section 331.045? Those points we shall discuss in the
light of the cases as such appear since the enactment of the main com-
parative negligence law.
One of the first cases to be decided under the Comparative Negli-
gence Law was that of Paluczak v. Jones.2 The evidence in that case
showed that both parties were negligent with respect to an automobile
collision. There was a counter-claim. It was held that where both
parties are negligent a dismissal of the case is not required since the
comparative negligence statute applies; that under this statute, where
both parties to a collision are negligent and there is a counter-claim,
one of the parties may recover when there is a finding that his negli-
gence is less than that of the other, but his recovery must be reduced
in such ratio as his negligence bears to the other's. In this case it was
also contended that the court should rule as a matter of law that
plaintiff's negligence was equal to defendant's and reverse the case with
directions to enter judgment of dismissal. The court, however, consid-
ered the question of what it termed "proportionate negligence" as a
matter for the jury. It, however, indicated that exceptional cases may
arise that would be a matter for the court solely.
In McGiggan v. Hiller Bros.3 the court was confronted with the
question whether as a matter of law it could say that the negligence of
the plaintiff in operating his car on the wrong side of the highway was
greater than that of the defendant in operating his car without the
clearance lights required by section 85.06 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
The court answered in the negative, stating that under the circum-
stances it could not say that the plaintiff's negligence as a matter of
law was greater than that of the defendant because the negligent acts
2209 Wis. 640, 245 N.W. 656 (1932).
3209 Wis. 402, 245 N.W. 97 (1932). Cf. Zenner v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0.
Ry. Co., 219 Wis. 124, 262 N.W. 581 (1935). In that case there was a finding
that the defendant failed to sound the whistle or ring the bell, and that such
failures were causes of the injury; that the deceased, who was a carrier of
freight for hire, was guilty of a slight want of ordinary care in failing
to stop before going on to the track and in failing to look and listen for the
approaching train; that this negligence was a cause of the injury; that the
deceased's negligence constituted 40 per cent of that involved in the collision
and that the defendant's negligence constituted 60 per cent. It appeared that
there really was only one default by the defendant, failure to ring the bell.
Hence the appellate court pointed out that if the jury could legitimately assess
the deceased's negligence at 40 per cent in comparison with two distinct vio-
lations by the defendant, there could be no rational ground for assessing his
negligence at less than 50 per cent with only one default pending in the
case. The court exercised its power, previously asserted, to set aside the
verdict of the jury with respect to percentages for the first time since the
adoption of the statute,
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differed in kind and quality and that it knew of no legal yardstick by
which it could classify, valuate and compare them. With respect to this
point, the court went on to point out that in Brown v. Haertel4 , which
was the first case decided under the comparative negligence law, under
a situation where plaintiff's negligence consisted of a failure to look
before entering an intersection, and the negligence of defendant con-
sisted of excessive speed and failure to yield the right-of-way, it was
held that the question whether the negligence of the plaintiff was as
great as that of the defendant was for the jury. It was, however,
pointed out that under some circumstances it might be proper for a
court to determine as a matter of law that the negligence of the plain-
tiff was as great as that of the defendant. The following example was
given: "If the negligence of each consisted simply in a failure to look
and they both had ample opportunity to discover each other, it might
be that their negligence would have to be equal," but the court was
careful to add that the instances in which a court can say as a matter
of law that the negligence of the plaintiff is equal to or greater than
that of the defendant will be extremely rare and will ordinarily be
limited to the cases where the negligence of each is precisely of
the same kind and character.
It is important to note the following language in Paluczak v. Joness:
"One of the parties may recover when there is a finding that his negli-
gence is less than that of the other, but his recovery must be reduced
in such ratio as his negligence bears to the other's."
The language "in such ratio as his negligence bears to the other's"
was withdraw by the court on a motion in a later case. In Cameron
v. Union Automobile Insurance Company6 the court went on to say
that instead of the language last quoted, the words "in proportion to
his negligence" should have been used, that this would have brought
the statement in strict accord with the language of the statute which is
"but any damages allowed shall be diminished by the jury in the pro-
portion to the amount of negligence attributed to the person recover-
ing." It follows from this that the basis of comparison is not directly
between the negligence of the plaintiff and that of the defendant. Let
us assume that the negligence of the plaintiff is 30 per cent and that of
the defendant 70 per cent. We are not to understand that the plaintiff
would recover the difference between 40 per cent and 70 per cent,
namely 30 per cent.
The facts in the Paluczak case disclose one party plaintiff and one
party defendant, both with negligence as a matter of law. The negli-
gence of both was found to be the proximate cause of the collision.
There was a counter-claim. Under these findings the court held as we
have observed above that the comparison and proportion of such negli-
gence was solely within the province of the jury. The court went on
further to state that where it is found that negligence in such circum-
stances of the one party is less than that of the other, the recovery of
such other or the party at fault must be reduced in such ratio as his
4210 Wis. 345, 244 N.W. 630 (1932). See also Zenner v. Chicago, St. P. M. &
0. Ry. Co., 219 Wis. 124, 262 N.W. 581 (1935).
5209 Wis. 640, 245 N.W. 656 (1932).6 210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W. 420 (1933).
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negligence bears to that of the other. Now it follows that such a state-
ment places the basis of comparison directly between the negligence of
the one and the other. Thus it would follow that if the plaintiff were
found to be 20 per cent negligent and the defendant 80 per cent, the
plaintiff could recover only the difference between 20 per cent and 80
per cent. Let us assume the damages amounted to $1,000. The plaintiff
would recover $600 under this particular construction of the Act, with
respect to the diminution of damages. The court, however, in Cameron
v. Union Auto Insurance Company7 explicitly eliminated this basis for
comparison and diminution of damages. In the Cameron case on a
motion for re-hearing it was contended that the plaintiff's recovery
was reduced by 20 per cent, whereas it should havebeen reduced by a
fourth, or 25 per cent. This contention was of course based on the
language of the Paluczak case. The plaintiff's husband was found by
the jury to be 20 per cent negligent and the defendant was found to
be 80 per cent negligent. The explicit statement runs as follows:
"Under this statute, Section 331.045, where both parties to a collision
are negligent, and there is a counter-claim, one of the parties may re-
cover when there is a finding that his negligence is less than that of the
other, but his recovery must be reduced in such ratio as his negligence
bears to the others."
With respect to this statement the court in the Cameron case thus
made it explicit: "The language 'in such ratio as his negligence bears
to the others' was inadvertently used and is withdrawn." Instead of
the language quoted, the words "in proportion to his negligence" should
have been used, according to the court. This would have brought the
statement in strict accord with the language of the statute, which is:
"but any damages allowed shall be diminished by the jury in proportion
to the amount of the negligence attributable to the person recovering."
The reduction therefore of 20 per cent rather than one fourth or 25
per cent under the percentages found in the Cameron case was cor-
rect, and was so upheld by the court and is now the settled law on this
point.
It is well to observe the implications of this rule. From the rule one
reaches certain results which in rare instances seem rather inequitable.
Let us assume that the negligence of the plaintiff, under certain given
facts is 49 per cent and that of the defendant is 51 per cent. Let us
further assume that plaintiff has been found to have suffered damages
amounting to $10,000. Under the rule in the Cameron case as set forth
above, the plaintiff would recover exactly $5,100, whereas under the
rule of the Paluczak case, as set forth above, the plaintiff could recover
only the sum of $200. The rule adopted in the Cameron case was up-
held and supported in Engelbrecht v. Bradley8 and in Honore v. Lud-
wig9
The question has been raised whether or not the comparative negli-
gence law covered not only situations governed by the common law
standard of ordinary care, but also such situations as were governed
by ordinances and legislative enactments. The Wisconsin Supreme
1210 Wis. 659, 246 N.W. 420 (1933).
8211 Wis. 1, 247 N.W. 451 (1933).
9211 Wis. 354, 247 N.W. 335 (1933).
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Court in the cases of Morley v. Reedsburg'0 and Mullen v. Larsen-
Morgan Construction Co.,:" as also in the case of Bent v. Jonet,'2 held
that the statute did cover such fields. In the Mullen case and in the
Bent case it was found that the defendant was guilty with respect to a
violation of the safe place statute. The comparative negligence law was
applied in both cases. In the Morley case it was contended on the part
of the defendant that the comparative negligence law did not apply in
that since Section 331.045 was applicable only when negligence on the
part of the defendant was the basis of an action and that in cases under
Section 8L15, to recover damages sustained by reason of the insuf-
ficiency or want of repair of any highway, liability does not rest upon
negligence. The court met this contention by showing that liability im-
posed by virtue of the said statute upon municipalities for damages
sustained by reason of the insufficiency or want of repair of any high-
way, renders failure to construct in the first instance sufficient negli-
gence as a matter of law. As a matter of fact the idea enunciated by
the court is not novel, and simply means that the violation of a statute
or ordinance or such enactment is negligence in se, or negligence as a
matter of law, and hence as negligence, must be compared with the
negligence of the plaintiff, and within the application of the Compara-
tive Negligence Act.
It seems then to be well settled in Wisconsin that the Comparative
Negligence Act applies not only to those situations covered by the
standard of ordinary care, but also to such situations as are covered by
ordinances or statutory enactments.
In the opening part of this note we refer to the fact that the Statute
which is now commonly known as the Comparative Negligence Act
was not the first comparative negligence statute in Wisconsin. There
are the others which we have set forth above. It is true that they are of
a limited nature and apply to particular situations and persons. The
question has been raised as to what effect Section 331.045, the main
Comparative Negligence Act, had on such prior statutes, whether or
not the new act superseded and abrogated the old ones. This question
came up in the case of Hammer v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & S.
Ste. Marie Railway.13 In this case plaintiff's intestate, a pedes-
trian, was struck by a train at a street crossing. The court found
as a matter of law, that the decedent was contributorily negligent. The
jury found that 85 per cent of the total negligence was attributable to
the defendant and 15 per cent to the decedent. judgment was entered
upon this verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The question was raised
whether the comparative negligence act applied to railroad accidents
of such character as this. The defendant contended that the law had no
application; that such accidents were governed by Section 192.28 of
the Wisconsin Statutes, which provides in the event of the negligent
omission of the railroad to comply with certain safety requirements
that slight want of ordinary care shall not bar recovery. Now in rail-
road accidents prior to the enactment of Section 331.045, more than a
10211 Wis. 504, 248 N.W. 431 (1933).
11212 Wis. 52, 249 N.W. 67 (1933).
12213 Wis. 635, 252 N.W. 290 (1934).
"3 216 Wis. 7, 255 N.W. 124 (1934).
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slight want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiff constituted a
complete defense, assuming of course that the negligent act of the
railroad company consisted of a violation of the safety requirements
prescribed by Section 192.29. The court went on to say that Section
192.29 exhausted its purpose when, as a penalty for violation of speci-
fied safety rules, it provided that slight want of ordinary care should
not constitute a defense, that when the negligence of the plaintiff is
more than such the provision has no operation. The defense was com-
plete under the law as it existed prior to the act, but, by the terms of
the Comparative Negligence Law, plaintiff's negligence, even though
it constituted more than a slight want of ordinary care, in fact a clear
want of ordinary care, must be compared with that of the railroad
company. Very evidently the Comparative Negligence Act as we ob-
serve from this case does not supersede the Limited Comparative
Negligence Act, Section 192.29, but it must be determined in each case
to which Section 192.29 applies, whether the plaintiff was guilty of
more than a slight want of ordinary care and in case of an affirmative
answer to this question, there must then be a comparison under the
provisions of the Comparative Negligence Law. In the particular case
the decedent was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and his negli-
gence as a matter of law also constituted more than a slight want of
ordinary care, and the court held it proper to require the jury to com-
pare his negligence with that of the railroad company. The case seems
to be important and settles the question of the-effect of the Compara-
tive Negligence Law with respect to liability under the limited com-
parative negligence acts enacted in Wisconsin previous to the main
act. It would appear then from this case that the rule now obtaining
is that where there is a violation of Section 192.29 (6) and the plaintiff
is guilty of only a slight want of ordinary care, then the old act ap-
plies, namely 192.29, but with respect to whatever negligence there may
be on the part of the plaintiff, which does not come under the express
provisions of that section, the Comparative Negligence Act applies,
and want of ordinary care in the circumstances, or contributory negli-
gence, is no longer a complete defense.
One of the most interesting and perhaps most intricate cases cited
under the Comparative Negligence Law is the Kroger case.' 4 In that
case the automobile of a certain Walker who was the host and driver
collided with a truck negligently parked, or rather stopped on the high-
way. A certain Bashaw and one Iselin, both guests of Walker, were
injured and brought action against the Kroger Grocery & Baking Com-
pany. A cross-complaint was filed by the latter against Walker for
contribution. The jury found that both the defendants were negligent;
that as between Walker and the Kroger Grocery & Baking Company,
the causal negligence on his part was 25 per cent, as compared to 75
per cent of causal negligence on the part of the Kroger Grocery &
Baking Company; that as between Iselin and the Kroger Grocery &
Baking Company causal negligence on Iselin's part was 15 per cent, as
compared to 85 per cent of causal negligence on the part of the Kroger
Grocery & Baking Company and also Walker, and that as between
Bashaw and the Kroger Grocery & Baking Company, the causal negli-
14 Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
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gence on Bashaw's part was 10 per cent as compared to 90 per cent
of causal negligence on the part of the Kroger Grocery & Baking Com-
pany and also Walker. With respect to the guests, Bashaw and Iselin,
in the automobile of Walker, the supreme court held that they, know-
ing the danger thereof, nevertheless acquiesced to the speed at which
the driver was driving and in his insufficient lookout, because of in-
ability to see ahead such distance as is required to enable him to stop
in time, and to avoid a collision while driving at such speed, assumed
the risk of injury incident thereto, including the risk involved in the
emergency thereby brought on when the driver was suddenly con-
fronted with the truck stopped on the highway. It follows from this
that there was no liability on the part of the driver for the resulting
injuries suffered by his guests. So therefore, with respect to the host-
guest relation, it would appear that assumption of risk is a complete
defense and that such assumption of risk is not an aspect of contribu-
tory negligence, but is essentially distinct therefrom. Now, assuming
that the guests in this case were considered in some way contributorily
negligent, rather than assuming the risk, then it would follow that
under the Comparative Negligence Law, the negligence of each guest
would be compared with that of the host, and if the negligence of such
host was found to be greater than that of the guest, then the guest
could recover the total amount of his damages, diminished however,
by the proportion of negligence attributed to such recovering guest.
However, assumption otfrisk under the definition of our courts seems
to employ no concept of negligence, but is merely a verbal formula for
stating that there was no duty on the part of the host with respect to
the guest in the circumstances under consideration. This idea has an
interesting origin and evolution. It seems in Wisconsin to have been
derived from such a case as Greenfield v. Miller,-5 which involved in-juries to the guest who was being entertained in a socially conservative
manner at the home of a friend. The court having in mind the English
case of Southcote v. Stanley'6 held as a matter of law that there was
no duty with respect to the guest in the circumstances. This concept,
it appears, our court has brought over into the host-guest situation
with respect to the private automobile, and in Eisenhut v. Eisenhut17
the court clearly enunciated that a minor of tender years who certainly
could not appreciate a risk inconsistent with its safety, and voluntarily
assume the same, was in no better position with respect to the enforce-
ment of its right to recover than were the adults concerned in the same
situation, on the theory that there was no duty, hence no violation
thereof and no corresponding right.
In a case decided a short time after the Kroger case, Scory v. La
Pave,'8 the supreme court reiterated the rule of the Kroger case, name-
ly that assumption of risk by the guest with respect to the negligent
acts of the host was a complete defense in an action by such guest
against the host. It is true, however, that there was filed in the Scory
case, a dissenting opinion by Mr. justice Fowler, who favored the idea
I5 175 Wis. 184, 180 N.W. 384 (1921).16 1 H. & N. 247, 156 Eng. Rep. 195 (1856).
17 Risenhut v. Eisenhut, 212 Wis. 467, 248 N.W. 440 (1933).18215 Wis. 21, 254 N.W. 643 (1934).
No. 4] NOTES
THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
that assumption of risk was merely an aspect of contributory negli-
gence and was not essentially distinct therefrom. The court, however,
has thought otherwise, and the rule in the Kroger case now obtains as
the law in Wisconsin. It does not follow, however, that the guest can-
not be guilty of contributory negligence, an inference which seems to
be assumed or drawn by some practitioners. It is easy to imagine a
guest momentarily catching hold of a wheel when the host driver is
faced with some difficulty of his own momentary and negligent crea-
tion, and thereby so increasing the danger that he is guilty of causal
negligence with respect to the damages suffered by himself. It would
seem that the guest under such circumstances is guilty of contributory
negligence and such contributory negligence under Section 331.045
would certainly be not a complete bar to an action by such guest against
the host.
A further consequence follows from the application of the doctrine
of assumption of risk in such a situation as obtained in the Kroger
case, namely that since assumption of risk is a complete defense there
is no common liability with respect to Walker and the Kroger Grocery
& Baking Company, and it follows from that that the rule of Standard
Accident Insurance Company v. Runquist'9 obtains, as tersely put by
court: "It is clearly established in Wisconsin that in order for one joint
tort feasor to have contribution against another it must be established
that they have been subjected to a common liability and that the one
seeking contribution has paid more than his equitable share of the com-
mon obligation." Thus the application of the doctrine of assumption
of risk in the host-guest relation and under the comparative negligence
law has led to some startling results.
It would appear from an analysis of the Kroger case that under the
Comparative Negligence Statute, Section 331.045, the causal negligence
of the person seeking to recover, Iselin or Bashaw, in this case, is to be
compared with the causal negligence of all of the other participants in
the transaction. From this it is clear that the negligence of Iselin or
Bashaw should be compared, not only with the negligence of the Kroger
Grocery & Baking Company, but with the negligence of both the Kro-
ger Grocery & Baking Company and Walker.
THOMAS P. WHELAN.
19209 Wis. 97, 242 N.W. 757 (1932).
